CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE by unknown
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VOL. XIV. MAY, 19o5 No. 7
CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE.
The lawyer in advising his clients is really in great measure
bound to assume the role of a prophet. When he tells them
what he thinks the law is, they cannot be certain that his predic-
tion will come true until it has been upheld by the highest
appellate court in the land. If he is not so fortunate as to
obtain a favorable decision he must console himself with the
thought that "eventus arbiter stultorum," and hope that his client
is a philosopher. Unlike the prophet, however, he has no un-
failing illumination from above, but must content himself with
obtaining what light he can from the law reports and endeavor-
ing from the past to judge the future. He is thus little more
than an expert guesser.
That delightful writer and cogent thinker, Buckle, has said
that a knowledge of history is valuable in that it furnishes us a
measure by which we may predict the future from the past.
This is all that the lawyer can do by examining past decisions.
There is in all modern states to-day a general conflict be-
tween certainty in the law and concrete justice in its applica-
tion to particular cases; in other words, between the effort to
have a general rule everywhere equally applicable to all cases
at all times and the effort to reach what may seem to be con-
crete right dealing between the parties at bar upon the particu-
lar facts in each case.
In actual practice the pendulum swings first one way and
then the other. The social necessity for stability in the law is
unquestioned. Law is necessarily a rule of action, and unless a
court decides cases according to some cohesive plan or rule, the
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justice administered is scarcely deserving of the name of
law, however greatly it may fall in with the ethical notions
of the community as regards any particular case. On
the other hand, when rules become so fixed and rigid that
they are difficult or impossible to change, the law is out of
touch with prevailing moral ideas, which like all other ideas
are constantly progressing; the law thus necessarily becomes a
clog upon national development, an incentive to revolutionary
reform.
Among semi-civilized people, absolute adhesion to the letter
of the law is the prevailing system. In the ancient Roman law
of the twelve tables, contracts in order to have any validity had
to be made with specific formulae, or the repetition of certain
particular words. It was not the substance of the contract rela-
tion-that is to say, the meeting of the minds and the consent of
the parties as to the subject matter of the contract-that was
looked to, but the formalities by which that meeting was evi-
denced. The sanctity attached to the use of a seal attests the
mystic value of forms among primitive peoples.
In the ancient common law, before the growth of the
equitable jurisdiction of the chancery, we see the same condi-
tion. It is illustrated by the story of the individual who, going
into a silk merchant's, asked the merchant for how much he
would sell him enough silk to go from ear to ear, and the mer-
chant immediately named the price. Thereupon the purchaser,
lifting his cap, showed him a place where the ear should be, and
pointing to his remaining ear, said: "My other ear is at
Newgate." As the ancient story goes, the merchant
was forced to give him several hundred yards of silk for the
price of a few inches. The same story is told in different forms
and is apparently an Indo-European legal legend.
Again we find a literal adherence to the letter of the con-
tract in the blacksmith case. An ignorant individual offered to
give a blacksmith two pence for the first nail, four pence for
the second and eight pence for the third, and so forth. When
the four feet were shod he found that it had cost him a number
of pounds, owing to his absolute ignorance of the laws of
geometrical progression. Nevertheless, he was held to the
letter of his bargain.
Again, in the medieval world, trial by ordeal supplanted to a
great degree the rational methods of determining facts. There
was no doubt felt of the guilt of the man whose feet were
burned by walking on red hot iron, and this method had the
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advantage of leaving open no questions for dispute. But with
the growth of modern civilization, came the necessity of apply-
ing to cases a general ethical standard to some degree at least
in accordance with that of the age.
Nevertheless a fair degree of certainty is a necessity in
every system of law: as a consequence, the common law doc-
trine of Stare Decisis was gradually evolved by the common law
courts as one mode of bringing about some sort of coherence in
the justice administered and in formulating that justice into rules
of law. That the doctrine is an old one does not admit of doubt
and modern research seems to indicate that it was first vaguely
adumbrated as far back as the fourteenth century. The truth
is that the doctrine is founded upon one of the peculiarities of
human nature which in its ultimate analysis is based upon the
imitative faculty in man. The mass of men will naturally
follow in a beaten track, rather than bralich out into new and
untrodden ways, and the courts naturally fell into the habit of
following precedent, just as merchants fall into the habit of
following certain usages of trade which after a time harden
into customs. In this way the judges by making a line of
uniform decisions on any question create a judicial custom
which in its turn acquires, almost unconsciously, the force
of law.
That the English courts have gone much farther than our
own in upholding the dignity of the doctrine of Stare Decisis,
may be easily illustrated by one or two prominent instances.
In 1843 the famous case of Queen v. Millis (zo C. and F. 534)
came before the House of Lords. The case was a prosecution
for bigamy. The question there involved was as to whether a
marriage contract in Ireland, without the presence of an ordained
clergyman or priest of the Church of England, was valid. The
Marriage Act not applying there, the common law alone gov-
erned. It was contended that in England the presence of a priest
had been absolutely necessary to such marriage by the rule of
the canon law prevailing throughout western Christendom,.up
to the time of the decree of the Council of Trent, which, owing
to the separation of the Church of England from the Roman
Catholic Church, had not gone into force there. The House of
Lords, however, decided from one or two precedents, which
historic research has now discovered were erroneously inter-
preted, that the law of England in this particular was different
from that of the rest of Western Europe and that a marriage
without the presence of such priest was invalid. The decision
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was reached by a divided court, the members of that tribunal
standing three to three, the form of the question, however,
being such that the decision was necessarily in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
In z86x this historically erroneous decision, reached by an
equally divided court, was brought in question before the same
tribunal in the case of Beemish v. Beemish (IX H. L. 275). The
very same question being again presented, a majority, at least,
of the judges were of the opinion that the decision of Queen v.
Millis was reached upon a false historical basis and that the
precedents adduced from the early English law to support that
decision, were misunderstood by the court. Lord Campbell
himself took that view. The court nevertheless felt bound to
follow that case and decided, contrary to the historic fact, that
a marriage without the presence of a clergyman of the Church
of England was and always had been invalid at the common law.
In rendering this decision, Lord Campbell said that he felt
himself bound by the doctrine of Stare Decisis and that to depart
therefrom would be a usurpation upon the part of the House of
Lords. His theory was that the law once laid down by that
tribunal became the law of the land, was binding upon the trib-
unal itself, as well as upon every other subject, and was changea-
ble only by the supreme authority of Parliament. This case con-
tains the strongest utterances that I have been able to find
upholding the absolute obligation of the rule of Stare Decisis.
"Had the present case been brought here by writ of error
previously to the decision of this House in the year z844 in the
case of Queen v. Millis, I should not have hesitated in advising
your Lordships to affirm the judgment in favor of the validity
of the marriage and the legitimacy of the respondent."
After giving his reasons for believing that a marriage with-
out the presence of a priest was valid at the common law, he
continues: "However it must now be considered as having
been determined by this House that there could never have
been a valid marriage in England before the Reformation, with-
out the presence of a priest episcopally ordained, or afterward
without the presence of a priest or of a deacon. . . . My
Lords, the decision in the case of the Queen v. Millis that
unless a priest especially ordained was present at the marriage
ceremony the marriage was null and void and the children of
the marriage were illegitimate, seemed to me so unsatisfactory,
that I deemed it my duty to resort to the extraordinary pro-
ceeding of entering a protest against it on your Lordships'
journal."
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And yet he continues: "But it is my duty to say that your
Lordships are bound by this decision as much as if it had been
pronounced nemine dissentiente and that the rule of law which
your Lordships lay down as the ground of your judgment.
sitting judicially, as the last and Supreme Court of Appeal for
this Empire, must be taken for law till altered by an act of
Parliament agreed to by the Commons and the Crown as well
as by your Lordships. The law laid down as your ratio decidendi
being clearly binding on all inferior tribunals and on all the
rest of the Queen's subjects, if it were not considered as
equally bnding upon your Lordships, this House would be
arrogating to itself the right of altering the law and legislating
by its own separate authority." The fiery law reformer,
Bentham, in his dread of judicial encroachment could hardly
have gone farther in limiting the power of appellate courts.
It must be remembered, however, that even in England that
useful and somewhat modern instrument-the distinction-is
not unknown and the results of strict adherence to Stare Decisis
may in many cases be escaped or mitigated by the use of that
now highly-developed weapon, even where to the ordinary
mind the distinction would not seem to involve even an
appreciable difference.
It is a rather curious thing that Lord Campbell's views,
which, at the time of their utterance, seemed to be in every
respect most conservative, were enunciated in almost the same
language by Mr. William J. Bryan in his campaign as nominee
of the Democratic Party for the Presidency in x896. At that
time he was generally looked upon as a radical, if nothing
worse, and his views as to the Supreme Court were the subject
of most severe strictures. I do not intend to comment upon
their wisdom or unwisdom, but his underlying view, as I under-
stand it, was that the Supreme Court once having passed upon
a question, that decision became the law of the land and was
binding upon that august tribunal as well as upon all other
American citizens. That view, which to many seemed so
startling as to savor of revolution, in any event had in it
nothing of novelty, and if Mr. Bryan did not cite the authority
of Lord Campbell, it was probably because he had overlooked
it. Whether the doctrine as enunciated by him would have
sounded less harsh had it been backed by the authority of that
great name, it is impossible to say. In the heat of political
conflict it might have mattered little.
It is a significant fact, however, that the same doctrine
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should be considered as over-conservative or as over-radical,
dependent upon the position of the person announcing it and
the circumstances of its announcement.
Mr. Justice Holmes, one of the greatest students of the
development of English law, adopts what would seem to be a
very different standpoint. He believes the judge-made law to
be a slow and steady growth which must adapt itself to present
needs and present necessities, and that the formal rules of the
syllogism do not and should not be allowed to fetter the
judges in reaching a result compatible with present ethical
notions and sound public policy.
"On the other hand, in substance the growth of the law is
legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that what the
courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It
is legislative in its grounds. The very considerations which
judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are
the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life.
I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of
more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most
generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate
convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public
policy in the last analysis. And as the law is administered by
able and experienced men, who know too much to sacrifice
good sense to a syllogism, it will be found that, when ancient
rules maintain themselves in the way that has been and will be
shown in this book, new reasons more fitted to the time have
been found for them, and that they gradually receive a new
content, and at last a new form, from the ground to which they
have been transplanted."
This latter view would seem to be the one more generally
prevalent in the United States. The highest courts, although
expressing great regard for the doctrine of Stare Decisis, do not
hesitate to overrule prior decisions upon the ground that they
were erroneously rendered, as the Supreme Court itself has
done upon several occasions and notably in the legal tender
and income tax cases and the passenger cases. The soundness
of this latter view depends upon how far conformity to present
standards of justice is more important than certainty as to
what the law actually is. It would surely be better if more
cases were overruled directly than by the indirect method of
the distinction.
By the indirect method a case once deemed to be law is
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gradually so honeycombed with exceptions ana distinctions
that after a certain number of years it finally collapses-in the
meanwhile, however, like a dangerous derelict, spreading con-
fusion amonglitigants, and consternation, real or feigned, among
awyers.
It is to be deprecated that in many cases respect for "la chose
jugle" should not allow the case to be directly overruled. In
the long run it may well be questioned whether the maintenance
or the dignity of the doctrine of Stare Decisis profits by the
respect apparently paid to it through a resort to distinctions
that do not distinguish.
On the other hand a strict adherence to the adjudged cases
would prevent all progress in the law, as has been pointed out
by Mr. Justice Matthews in the famous case of Hurtado v.
California, zio U. S. 5z6, and would result in a rigidity incom-
patible with social progress:
"To hold that such a characteristic is essential to due
process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but
its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.
It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeable-
ness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians."
That delightful and most erudite old writer, Montaigne,
gives an instance of how far false respect for a judicial decision
may be carried. He says that he heard of a case occurring in
his time in which a thief, having been convicted by the court
of a certain province, was condemed to death. While awaiting
execution the judges of a neighboring province sent word to
the judges of the tribunal that had condemned the supposed
culprit, that the real culprit had been found, had confessed his
guilt and was about to be punished. The judges of the first
province held solemn deliberation on the question as to whether
justice required that the innocent man, adjudged guilty, should
be freed or whether respect for "la chosejuge" did not require
that the court should proceed with the execution of the sen-
tence. The latter view prevailed. The dignity of the tribunal
was thus sustained by the prompt and solemn execution of the
legally adjudged guilty but in fact innocent victim.
The truth is, that the pendulum is constantly oscillating
between a desire for certainty on the one hand and a desire for
flexibility and conformity to present social standards upon the
other. It is impossible that in a progressive society the law
should be absolutely certain; it is equally impossible that the
YALE LA W JOURNAL.
courts should render decisions conforming to the prevailing
notions of equity without thereby causing a considerable degree
of uncertainty, owing to the constant fluctuations in moral
standards and their application to new and unforeseen questions.
New ideas are often if not always due to economic changes
and many views regarding natural rights or individual liberty
which were held fundamental in the eighteenth century, some-
times find little support in the public opinion of the twentieth,
by reason of changed social and economic conditions.
The rights of the individual were once opposed to those of
the state alone. He is now opposed to the state and to those
great aggregates of wealth in corporate form and possessing to
a great degree public powers. The rules evolved before the
rise of corporations as the main factors in the business world
are not always applicable to present conditions.
When a series of questions has finally become settled, such
as the law relating to partnership or negotiable instruments, it
is because that particular branch of business has reached for
the time being, at least, an ultimate form and we have certainty
in law because we have fixity in business custom and opinion.
It has been happily said that the sense of equity of one gen-
eration is generally the law of the next, but this very fact
involves a slow process of change and adaptation resulting in
consequent uncertainty.
There is much criticism at the bar at the present time, of the
growing uncertainty of law, as enunciated in judicial decisions;
panaceas of all kinds are suggested by zealous and sometimes
intelligent men, but the law reformer is a dangerous animal
and one calculated often to do infinite mischief. He necessarily
believes himself to contain more concentrated wisdom than all
the generations of lawyers and judges who have gone before,
and actual experience has proved that his self-valuation is not
infrequently an over-appraisal.
It is perhaps not unprofitable to inquire whether the people
of the Continent of Europe are so much better off than our-
selves in regard to certainty in their law. An extended
attempt at comparison on this point would involve work far
beyond the scope of this article. A few reflections, however,
upon the continental method may not be without interest.
The fear of the uncertainty of judge-made law and the
usurpation of courts has been even more prevalent in Europe
than in America. This fear is well illustrated by what took
place at the time of the promulgation of the Prussian Code of
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1794. It was understood and the judges were instructed that if
a case of first impression or a case not absolutely covered by
the letter of the code should arise, they were to refer to the
Prussian Legislative Council for decision, which decision
would, of course, have taken legislative form. Some cases
arose in this way and were referred to the council, which was an
active body and whose time was taken up with other matters.
The cases thus sent to them from the courts were quietly
dropped and the judges were informed they would have to
proceed as best they could without legislation for each particu-
lar case, and thus that attempt to curtail possible judicial
encroachment failed utterly.
The French law was supposed not to recognize the authority
of adjudged cases, but in fact the result reached is very similar
to that in England and America. The Court of Cassation was
established for the purpose of unifying judge-made law, which
had been made uniform as far as legislation could effect it by
the Code Napoleon. The Court of Cassation has jurisdiction
over all cases coming up from the various courts of appeal, of
which there are some twenty-six, in France, and, by the Statute
of 1837, the decisions of the Court of Cassation were made
authoritative, so that they had to be followed by all courts of
appeal. This statute was made necessary by the hopeless con-
flicts which had arisen between the various courts of appeal,
and the uncertainty thus engendered was so great as to call for
radical remedy. But in addition to the decisions of the Court
of Cassation, the French judges in the courts of appeal natur-
ally desire to have a certain amount of uniformity in their
decisions and therefore where one or two similar decisions are
rendered they are almost invariably followed and a judicial
usage on the subject is thus established much as in England or
America. The only practical difference would seem to be
that the French courts will not hesitate to overrule a case
which they believe has become antiquated or was erroneously
decided originally, and thus they do not resort to the method of
the distinction which with us not infrequently accomplishes the
same result through fiction. As a consequence the French lawyer
is confronted with a great number of reports, the number of
reported opinions in France being perhaps greater than that of
any one state of the Union.
The Code Napoleon left certain great gaps which could only
be filled in by legislation or by judge-made law. As corpora-
tions had scarcely begun to develop at the time of the adoption
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of the Code, there was almost nothing in that body of legisla-
tion to cope with the modern conditions which grew up there-
after, and hence under the Second Empire the void had to be
filled and a detailed law of corporations enacted.
In many instances provisions of the Code have been in effect
wholly repealed by judicial decisions, so that a directly opposite
result from that desired by the codifiers has been in fact
reached. Trusts were abolished by the Code and yet have
been to a great extent revived by the courts. State annuities
were not attachable under the French law, but by a long line of
decisions a result has been reached which in fact makes them
attachable for debt, and other instances to the same effect might
be cited.
It must also be remembered that the Code, admirable as it is
by' reason of its lucidity, due largely, if not wholly, to the
French intellect and language so wonderfully adapted to the
expression of clear thought, is now becoming in many respects
antiquated. A movement is on foot in France to change the
Code in essential particulars. The nation feels that its system
of law has been more or less outgrown and finds itself in the
condition of a boy who has outgrown his youthful clothes. The
system of French law is criticised as one incompatible with
the notions of to-day and as belonging in many respects to
a social system which has in great measure passed away. The
French 'Minister of Justice at the recent celebration of the cen-
tenary of the "Code Civil," used the following significant lan-
guage:
"The Code Civil did not and could not foresee everything.
It would be puerile to deny that it needs revision, for in fact
Parliament does revise it daily. Already many drafts of laws on
corporations and insurance are presented for enactment into leg-
islation which really present the appearance of special codes and
in addition the work of making a Code of Labor is progressing.
"Thus the great voids in the Civil Code are being filled in.
Moreover judicial decisions revealfrom day to day the new needs of society
and aply the will of the nation to .particular cases, disclose new formulae
and reveal new sources of law by providing new sources of light.
"I would ask to have a great commission appointed to com-
pare bur Civil Code with those of other peoples, to note the
differences, to analyze the solutions of the new problems
adopted by foreign legislations, and to study the solutions
reached by our neighbors, in order that we may profit from the
work of all, as all have profited from the work of the French
jurists.
"The more the intellectual domain of humanity is enlarged,
the more the development of industry and of science diversify
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forms of production and forms of property, the greater the
political ascendency of the proletariat tends to cause a recogni-
tion by society of new rights and of contracts heretofore
unknown, the less can it be pretended that a code can contain
and hem in the powerful movements of a nation's life.
"What then is the use of our re-making our Code from the
beginning? It never prevented changes in the law, nor did it
ever paralyze the law. It can be adapted to every change and
seems like a well-conceived plan where every degree of progress
may naturally be placed under its proper classification."
It is thus very doubtful whether the French law is any more
certain than our own. If ours be more uncertain we are
inclined to believe that it is because economic changes here
have come faster than in other countries, and greater pressure
has been put upon the courts to decide cases arising out of
novel business situations.
The fact is that the two systems, while founded upon differ-
ent theoretical bases are tending in fact to reach very much the
same results in very much the same way. Law reformers have
been for a long time suggesting the codification of our law. As
far as greater certainty is concerned, Ido not see any advantage
to be derived from codification. The objections to codification
are, first, the difficulties of obtaining from our legislatures a
good code and one that is not in constant danger of amendment
for the purpose of meeting specific cases. Tb at monstrum
korrendum, the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, is so
recent and lamentable a monument of the failure of legislative
attempts at codification that it is not necessary to refer to it in
detail.
The foreign codes have the advantage of a fixed and settled
terminology derived from the Roman law. They were made
by experts and are little subject to legislative change. In
addition it must be remembered that the making of the Code
Napoleon, as well as that of the recent German Code, was due
to a desire for uniformity in law rather than for certainty. As
Voltaire remarked: "One changed systems of jurisprudence
each time one changed his omnibus in pre-revolutionary
France." Therefore, the Code was for the purpose of giving
the nation a national law rather than the obtaining of certainty
in any one or more branches of the law in a particular jurisdic-
tion. Some of the continental codes are very defective and
have hindered legal development.
The .French Code of Commerce is inferior to the Code Civil
in every respect. It shows one of the most marked defects of
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code law in that it codified commercial usages of the seven-
teenth century and thus retarded the development of French
law in those important particulars.
Another objection, and perhaps the main one, to a code, is
that even a well-constructed code would help us little in making
the law more certain. The general principles or rules on
many subjects are pretty well settled and easily stated. The
common law of tort or partnership and negotiatle instruments
is admirably summed up in various text-books and could with-
out great difficulty be codified, but that would do little to help
us out of our difficulties for the question arising in these
branches of the law is not generally what is the rule of law,
but which of several rules apply to the facts of the case. The
divisions that have taken place in our Supreme Court have not
been due to common law questions, but to questions arising
under various statutes and under the Constitution of the United
States, one of the clearest and most admirable of written instru-
ments. As the most familiar instance of this, it is only neces-
sary to cite the insular cases, the legal tender cases, the income
tax cases and the anti-trust law cases. In each one of these, the
difficulty has been to ascer~in whether the law applied to a
particular state of facts and if it did apply, which portion of it
was applicable. Did the Sherman Act intend to codify the
common law? Was it merely declaratory or was it revolution-
ary? The answer must be sought in many opinions extending
over a period of some ten years. Such cases cannot be avoided
and constantly arise under statutes.
And again, should we codify our law, the old decisions
would be cited as an attempt to show what the law was intended
to do and we would not get rid of the masses of case law which
now so sorely burden and perplex the practitioner.
The civil law of Rome grew largely out of commentaries on
the Twelve Tables, and it was really the commentators who
expressed the law, long after the Twelve Tables had ceased to
represent the legal views of the time. Justinian endeavored by
law to prevent the writing of commentaries on his Code and
Napoleon is reported to have exclaimed, when it was announced
to him that a commentary on the code had already appeared:
"My code is lost!" There is thus no patent remedy for the
situation of legal uncertainty that confronts us. It is due to
changed social conditions and the conflict of new ideas with old
ones, which is now at an acute stage.
Mr. Lea, the distinguished American historian, has said
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that if you want to know the ideas that dominate a particular
age, you must examine its jurisprudence. Perhaps the com-
plex and confused condition of our jurisprudence is a more
faithful reflex of the public mind than we realize. Certain
great branches of the law have been pretty thoroughly worked
out and the ideas of the community thereon crystallized into
positive law. Whether this has been codified or is found in the
decisions, is of little importance. On other great questions
such as the relation of capital and labor and of corporations to
the state and the individual, the public mind is in a flux. It
will be impossible to get uniformity in this regard until we have
some uniformity in opinion, which will then reflect itself
through legislation and through judge-made law. The one will
be confused and incoherent and the other vacillating and uncer-
tain until such a time arrives.
For the present, reforms in the administration of the law,
the selection of able men as judges, the leaving of procedural
questions, as has been done in Massachusetts, largely to the
regulation of the courts themselves by rules, are all desirable
and immediate objects of attainment, but to make the law cer-
tain on subjects as to which the community itself is most uncer-
tain, is a task that never has yet and never will be accom-
plished. If the Hindoo laws are unchanged and unchangeable,
it is because the Hindoo himself has not changed and does not
wish to change his opinions and ideas nor the actions which
flow from them. When we reach that stage of development
the question may become academic.
Frederic R. Coudert.
